After 31-years, the identity of Wichita, Kansas' most notorious serial killer, known as BTK, was made public after the suspect's arrest on February 26, 2005. Dennis L. Rader, 59, of Park City, Kansas was taken into custody after having been stopped at a traffic light near his home on East Kechi Road shortly after noon that day. Even though formal charges have not yet been filed, the authorities said, "they would ask prosecutors to file 10 counts of first degree murder against Rader, including two murders in Park City that had not previously been attributed to the BTK killer," it was reported in a February 26th MSNBC article.
Police Chief Norman Williams
Police Chief Norman Williams
The question now on everyone's lips is, "Who is Dennis L. Rader?" Relatively little is know about him, especially since prosecutors are reluctant to divulge too much information, which could harm the up-coming trial. What is certain is that Rader spent most of his life in Park City.
Rader was born in 1945 and grew up in Wichita along with three brothers, all of whom graduated from Heights High School in Wichita.
Rader was in the Air Force in Viertnam from 1965 to 1969. Joseph Otero, BTK's victim, was also in the Air Force at the same time.
Rader worked in the meat department for a Park City grocery store and then as an assembler at the Coleman camping gear firm between 1971 and 1973, where he met two of his earlier victims, Mike Brunker reported in a MSNBC article.
He worked at ADT Security Services from 1974 through 1989. In 1989, he also worked for the U.S. Census bureau going door-to-door collecting information. While working in both positions, Rader had access to many area residents' homes. It is believed that he might have initially encountered some of his victims while on the job.
At some point in the 1970s, Rader married and he and his wife Paula had two children, a boy and girl. At around the same time, he attended Wichita State University and in 1979 graduated with a degree in Administration of Justice. According to Fox News, Rader "never became an officer but instead went "into code enforcement, or what one critic called "a glorified dog catcher."
In his spare time, Rader lead a Cub Scouts group and was active in his church. No one imagined he was capable of doing any harm to anybody. Many referred to him as a kind of guy who wasn't very noticeable, one who never really stood out from others. In fact, it was his ability to "blend in" that allowed him to go undetected for so many years.
Sunday, January 10, 2010
Friday, December 25, 2009
stepped 4.ste.002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
By 1981, a year before she was finally stopped, Jones demanded to be put in charge of the sickest patients. That placed her close to those that died more often. She seemed to thrive on the excitement of an emergency, and even on grief when a child didn't make it. She always wanted to take the corpse to the morgue.
It became clear to everyone that children were dying in this unit from problems that shouldn't have been fatal. The need for resuscitation suddenly seemed constant---but only when Jones was around. Those in the most critical condition were all under her care. One child had a seizure three days in a row, but only on her shift. "They're going to start thinking I'm the Death Nurse," Jones quipped one day. In fact, some of the staff called her duty hours the Death Shift.
Then a baby named Jose Antonio Flores, six months old, went into cardiac arrest while in Jones's care. He was revived, but went into arrest again the next day during her shift and died from bleeding, the cause of which was unknown. While treating the father for a heart attack, she allowed the brother to carry the corpse. Then she grabbed it and ran down the hospital corridors with the dead baby in her arms. No one could figure out what her behavior meant, but blood testing on the corpse indicated an overdose of a drug called Heparin, an anticoagulant. No one had ordered it.
Another disturbing mystery.
Then Rolando Santos, being treated for pneumonia, was having seizures, cardiac arrest, and extensive unexplained bleeding. All of his troubles developed or intensified on Jones's shift. Finally one doctor stepped forward and told the hospital staff that she was killing children. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire needed to do an investigation. Yet the nurses continued to protect their own, especially those in charge. Since the hospital did not want bad publicity, they accepted whatever the head nurses said.
Another child was sent to the pediatrics unit to recover from open-heart surgery. At first, he progressed well, but on Jones's shift, he became lethargic. Then his condition deteriorated and he soon died. In view of others, Jones grabbed a syringe and squirted fluid over the child in the sign of a cross, and then repeated it on herself.
Finally, three months after the initial suspicions, a committee was formed to look into the problem. They decided to replace the LVNs with RNs on the unit, and Jones promptly resigned. To their mind, that took care of the problem.
It became clear to everyone that children were dying in this unit from problems that shouldn't have been fatal. The need for resuscitation suddenly seemed constant---but only when Jones was around. Those in the most critical condition were all under her care. One child had a seizure three days in a row, but only on her shift. "They're going to start thinking I'm the Death Nurse," Jones quipped one day. In fact, some of the staff called her duty hours the Death Shift.
Then a baby named Jose Antonio Flores, six months old, went into cardiac arrest while in Jones's care. He was revived, but went into arrest again the next day during her shift and died from bleeding, the cause of which was unknown. While treating the father for a heart attack, she allowed the brother to carry the corpse. Then she grabbed it and ran down the hospital corridors with the dead baby in her arms. No one could figure out what her behavior meant, but blood testing on the corpse indicated an overdose of a drug called Heparin, an anticoagulant. No one had ordered it.
Another disturbing mystery.
Then Rolando Santos, being treated for pneumonia, was having seizures, cardiac arrest, and extensive unexplained bleeding. All of his troubles developed or intensified on Jones's shift. Finally one doctor stepped forward and told the hospital staff that she was killing children. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire needed to do an investigation. Yet the nurses continued to protect their own, especially those in charge. Since the hospital did not want bad publicity, they accepted whatever the head nurses said.
Another child was sent to the pediatrics unit to recover from open-heart surgery. At first, he progressed well, but on Jones's shift, he became lethargic. Then his condition deteriorated and he soon died. In view of others, Jones grabbed a syringe and squirted fluid over the child in the sign of a cross, and then repeated it on herself.
Finally, three months after the initial suspicions, a committee was formed to look into the problem. They decided to replace the LVNs with RNs on the unit, and Jones promptly resigned. To their mind, that took care of the problem.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
disbelief 5.dis.993 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Prosecutor Rubino countered McMahon's presentation with the fact that when the store opened on the morning after the Dowd murder, Christopher had reported to his boss, Jaesa Phang, that a white woman about forty-five years old had been murdered in the alley, but the police had not revealed those details to anyone. In fact, just a few days after the stabbing death, he had also made a strange comment to Phang: "Maybe I killed her." Although he quickly recanted, it was a remark that his employer would remember, especially because he seemed not only quite serious about it, but remarkably curious about the incident itself. Christopher, Phang said, had gestured with the motions of gutting a person as he described the crime. He claimed to have seen a white man on the street at 1:00 A.M., but no one else had reported that. Instead, the only witnesses that police had from the streets that night had all seen Christopher.
Philadelphia District Attorney logo
Philadelphia District Attorney logo
Phang testified on December 3 that Christopher had told her about five days after the murder that he had been unable to sleep well because he had witnessed a murder. His speech was rambling and his manner agitated. He said that he thought a white man who knew he'd seen it was trying to kill him. He believed that the man could get into his apartment and would hide in the closet. The next day, Christopher was arrested.
For physical evidence, the prosecution had found a tiny spot of blood on Christopher's trousers, but it was too small to type, and DNA analysis at that time was still being challenged in many courts. It was also not yet available for such minute amounts of biological evidence, and was quite expensive. The police had also found a bloodstained tissue that proved to be Type O—Dowd's blood type—in a driveway next to the building where Christopher's apartment was. But Christopher had told police in statements read to the jury that while he was at his girlfriend's apartment, he had seen a well-dressed white man in his forties outside that night wiping his hands on something that looked like a handkerchief or tissue. The problem was, Christopher had not been in that apartment.
The trial was short, and closing arguments came quickly on December 11. McMahon emphasized Christopher's good character and the fact that such violence of which he was accused was completely out of character for him. The prosecution had offered no motive, no weapon, and no solid evidence. And his statement about the white man on the night of the murder fit the description given by other witnesses about men they had seen with earlier victims. "It just doesn't make sense," McMahon said about the prosecution's scenario. He told reporters on December 11 after it went to the jury, "The case stinks. It's garbage."
But ADA Rubino asked what motive the witnesses had for lying. In fact, some of them were friends with Christopher, including the one who had lied on his behalf to the police. There was no reason for that witness to ultimately change her story other than wanting to finally tell the truth. In addition, Rubino reminded the jury that she had presented two other witnesses who had seen Christopher talking to Dowd in a bar at midnight of the night she was murdered. She had also offered testimony from Christopher's girlfriend, Vivien Carter, that he had not been with her that night, as he had claimed. Rubino closed with an emotional appeal that included what Carol Dowd must have experienced as she was being attacked with a knife and slashed to death. She knew her death was coming. The cuts to her hands told the story.
Once the arguments were done, the judge instructed the jury. They deliberated for more than four hours before he ended the session and sequestered them for the night. By the next Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire day, it was apparent that the jury believed the prosecution's case. On December 12, after four more hours of deliberations, they convicted Christopher of the first-degree murder of Carol Dowd. A few members were visibly upset.
"Christopher showed no visible reaction," wrote Linda Loyd in the Philadelphia Inquirer, but "his defense attorney shook his head in disbelief." Although the prosecutor had asked for the death penalty, Christopher was sentenced to life in prison, but his own reaction was that he had been railroaded by "pipers" (prostitutes cajoled into testifying by the police). Apart from his strange admission to his boss, he had confessed to nothing. McMahon indicated that "the real killer [whom Christopher referred to as the Northeast Stalker] may still be out there."
Was he right?
Philadelphia District Attorney logo
Philadelphia District Attorney logo
Phang testified on December 3 that Christopher had told her about five days after the murder that he had been unable to sleep well because he had witnessed a murder. His speech was rambling and his manner agitated. He said that he thought a white man who knew he'd seen it was trying to kill him. He believed that the man could get into his apartment and would hide in the closet. The next day, Christopher was arrested.
For physical evidence, the prosecution had found a tiny spot of blood on Christopher's trousers, but it was too small to type, and DNA analysis at that time was still being challenged in many courts. It was also not yet available for such minute amounts of biological evidence, and was quite expensive. The police had also found a bloodstained tissue that proved to be Type O—Dowd's blood type—in a driveway next to the building where Christopher's apartment was. But Christopher had told police in statements read to the jury that while he was at his girlfriend's apartment, he had seen a well-dressed white man in his forties outside that night wiping his hands on something that looked like a handkerchief or tissue. The problem was, Christopher had not been in that apartment.
The trial was short, and closing arguments came quickly on December 11. McMahon emphasized Christopher's good character and the fact that such violence of which he was accused was completely out of character for him. The prosecution had offered no motive, no weapon, and no solid evidence. And his statement about the white man on the night of the murder fit the description given by other witnesses about men they had seen with earlier victims. "It just doesn't make sense," McMahon said about the prosecution's scenario. He told reporters on December 11 after it went to the jury, "The case stinks. It's garbage."
But ADA Rubino asked what motive the witnesses had for lying. In fact, some of them were friends with Christopher, including the one who had lied on his behalf to the police. There was no reason for that witness to ultimately change her story other than wanting to finally tell the truth. In addition, Rubino reminded the jury that she had presented two other witnesses who had seen Christopher talking to Dowd in a bar at midnight of the night she was murdered. She had also offered testimony from Christopher's girlfriend, Vivien Carter, that he had not been with her that night, as he had claimed. Rubino closed with an emotional appeal that included what Carol Dowd must have experienced as she was being attacked with a knife and slashed to death. She knew her death was coming. The cuts to her hands told the story.
Once the arguments were done, the judge instructed the jury. They deliberated for more than four hours before he ended the session and sequestered them for the night. By the next Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire day, it was apparent that the jury believed the prosecution's case. On December 12, after four more hours of deliberations, they convicted Christopher of the first-degree murder of Carol Dowd. A few members were visibly upset.
"Christopher showed no visible reaction," wrote Linda Loyd in the Philadelphia Inquirer, but "his defense attorney shook his head in disbelief." Although the prosecutor had asked for the death penalty, Christopher was sentenced to life in prison, but his own reaction was that he had been railroaded by "pipers" (prostitutes cajoled into testifying by the police). Apart from his strange admission to his boss, he had confessed to nothing. McMahon indicated that "the real killer [whom Christopher referred to as the Northeast Stalker] may still be out there."
Was he right?
Thursday, July 30, 2009
Foreign Minister Toyoda 5.fmt.0003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
18. Mr. Dooman Confers with Mr. Terasaki
On August 18, 1941 at 3:00 P.M. Mr. Terasaki, Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, requested Mr. Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of the American Embassy in Tokyo, to convey a private message to Ambassador Grew.[74] Stressing the importance of the interview to be held that afternoon at 4:00 P.M., between the Japanese Foreign Minister and Ambassador Grew, Mr. Terasaki's note expressed the hope that the meeting would initiate a series of conversations for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations for he believed that if the Cabinet under Prince Konoye failed in this objective, all hope of reconciliation would be lost. He urged that criticism of the actions and policies of either government be avoided, and warned that though the Japanese government was ready to respond to any proposal of the United States to end the Far Eastern conflict, Japan would under no circumstances give in to American pressure.
Requesting Mr. Dooman to inform Ambassador Grew that there was much optimism in all influential quarters with regard to the outcome of the conversations, Mr. Terasaki hoped that the American Ambassador would do everything possible to achieve the desired results. The conversations were to be "off the record", by which Mr. Terasaki meant that there would be no commitment on either side in regard to any question arising during the conversations.[75]
19. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (August 18, 1941)
(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[76]
Ambassador Grew called on Foreign Minister Toyoda at the latter's request at 4:00 P.M. on August 18, 1941. After first receiving assurance from Ambassador Grew that the matters under discussion would be treated with the greatest secrecy,[77] and that no reports would reach Germany or Italy, Admiral Toyoda began a long oral statement requiring two hours and a half for delivery, regarding the critical situation then existing between Japan and the United States. Declaring that Japan had moved troops into French Indo-China solely for the purpose of settling the China affair, Foreign Minister Toyoda insisted that Japan had been acting under its own initiative and that there was no basis for the drastic economic measures which the United States had taken against his country under the mistaken belief that Japan was acting at the instigation of Germany.
Japanese public opinion had become extremely excited but the government was doing all in its power to repress hostile press comment. Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that the Japanese reply to the President's proposal of July 24, 1941 had been carefully drafted to meet the intentions of the American government, and that it contained proposals which would bind both governments. However, since the President's proposal had dealt exclusively with the joint defense of Indo-China, the Japanese reply was also restricted to that subject and would deal with it independently of the Hull-Nomura conversations.
On August 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had received from Secretary Hull the American reply to the Japanese proposal, and the Japanese authorities were disturbed to note in it that the United States had attached little importance to Japan's answer to President Roosevelt's proposal. The American proposal had suggested the withdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indo-China as a prerequisite, although Japan had promised to withdraw after the China Incident was settled.
If the United States wanted peace in the Pacific, Japan suggested that America cooperate in settling the China Incident. Both Japanese and American statesmen were sincerely striving
[74] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", initialled by Eugene H. Dooman, August 18, 1941, S.D., II, 559-560.
[75] Ibid.
[76] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", August 18, 1941,
[77] S.D., II, 560-564.
[17]
for peace, according to the Japanese Foreign Minister, and to have a breakdown of peace occur now would be evidence of lack of statesmanship on both sides.
Both countries had a duty to save the world from disaster, and for this reason they must consider their mutual problems in a calm and friendly atmosphere on an equal basis.
Because present relations were extremely strained as a result of misunderstandings on both sides and sinister designs by other countries, it would be most opportune if the leaders of both countries could meet at Honolulu to discuss the situation in person.
Foreign Minister Toyoda said that he intended to have Ambassador Nomura see President Roosevelt in person to make this suggestion, and he requested Ambassador Grew to support this plan, which was unprecedented in Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Japanese history, since it involved the Premier's going abroad and would be done despite the objections of certain Japanese elements.
The Japanese Foreign Minister assured Ambassador Grew that the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, would make every effort to save the world from ruin and to maintain peace in the Pacific, and he expressed his conviction that President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye would be able to reach an equitable agreement since Japan was not necessarily bound by the reply made on August 6 by Ambassador Nomura to President Roosevelt's proposal of July 24, 1941. Foreign Minister Toyoda also stressed the necessity for avoiding any impression that Japan had entered into negotiations with the United States because of American pressure. He suggested, therefore, that both countries reciprocate in stopping or moderating various measures of economic pressure.
In his report Ambassador Grew reiterated that he realized the great need for secrecy in this matter, and indicated that he appreciated the reasons for Japan's negotiating through Ambassador Nomura in the United States rather than in Tokyo. However, he informed Foreign Minister Toyoda that in view of Japan's progressive southward advance, the United States could be governed only by Japan's actions and not by its words. He also pointed out that previously Japan had ascribed its move into Indo-China as a reaction against encirclement by other powers but now it was ascribing it to the settling of the China affair. The Japanese Foreign Minister made no comment on the remarks of the American Ambassador.
Ambassador Grew restated Mr. Hull's opinion expressed by Mr. Welles on July 23, 1941 that there appeared to be no basis for continuing the conversations which had been carried on in Washington between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura. He also spoke of Mr. Hull's statement to Ambassador Nomura on August 8, 1941 that the answer of Japan to the proposal of President Roosevelt failed in responsiveness. Though withholding official comment until the American government had time to study the proposal just made by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Ambassador Grew promised to give it his personal support,.[78]
(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report
It is believed that no detailed report of the conversation between Foreign Minister Toyoda and Ambassador Grew was forwarded to the Japanese Embassy at Washington. However, on August 21, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Minister briefly referred to this conversation in a message to Ambassador Nomura.[79]
Pointing out that if Japan and the United States were to surmount the crisis confronting them at present, it would be necessary to display real statesmanship, and reminding Ambassador Grew of his nine years of tireless work to maintain Japanese-American friendship, Foreign Minister Toyoda again strongly urged that the proposed conference of the leaders of the two nations take place.[80]
[78] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", August 18, 1941, S.D., II 560-564.
[79] III, 49.
[80] Ibid.
[81] "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State", August 18, 1941, S.D., II, 565.
[18]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
20. Ambassador Grew Urges Consideration of Japanese Proposal
In a report to Secretary Hull and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, Ambassador Grew urged that the new Japanese proposal be given the utmost consideration, since not only was such a suggestion unprecedented in Japanese history, but it indicated that Japan's intransigence had not completely crystallized. Furthermore, Ambassador Grew believed that a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt would be of incalculable value in bringing peace in the Pacific.[81]
21. Ambassador Nomura Is Convinced of President Roosevelt's Sincerity
On August 20, 1941 Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo that in a recent conversation Postmaster-General Walker had stressed the fact that President Roosevelt had taken up the question of the proposed Japanese-American conferences immediately upon his return to Washington. Furthermore, by his past speeches and most recent statement, it was evident that President Roosevelt had a broad-minded view of the world situation and was in no way anti-Japanese in his feelings, and, therefore, Japan should reciprocate in a like manner.
When Ambassador Nomura responded that it was with strong resolution that the Japanese government had continued its dealings with the current problem, Mr. Walker emphasized that this was also true of President Roosevelt for even if there were no real justification, there was much anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States. If news of the proposed conference were to leak out, Congress would undoubtedly raise strong opposition to it. On the other hand, there was a great possibility of achieving peace in the Pacific, if the conference succeeded. In view of President Roosevelt's present feeling, Mr. Walker asked that a way be found to settle successfully the Japanese-American question.[82]
On the following day, August 21, 1941, Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo of further indications of President Roosevelt's serious interest in the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations. According to rumors, the text of the note delivered to Ambassador Nomura on August 17, 1941[83] had been composed by President Roosevelt himself, and the President expected that a Japanese reply would be handed directly to him.
With this in mind, Ambassador Nomura was of the opinion that the Japanese reply should be in simple and direct phraseology. Referring to the text of his proposed reply to President Roosevelt's note, Ambassador Nomura decided to omit such expressions as "continuance of encirclement" and "of discrimination of boycott and barriers of personal integrities and attack." At the same time, however, Ambassador Nomura felt it essential that Japan emphasize the necessity of guaranteeing the safety of the Far East.[84]
22. Ambassador Nomura Suggests A New Proposal
In a message to Tokyo on August 20, 1941 Ambassador Nomura expressed the opinion that President Roosevelt, desirous of settling Japanese-American problems by a conference between the two government heads, had made this proposal as his last political move at the critical moment when Japanese-American relations were at their worst. Urging that Japan respond to the generous spirit exhibited by President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura asked Tokyo to leave decisions concerning concrete points in the proposals until some future date, thereby showing the American government that Japan would allow nothing to conflict with the successful resumption of the informal negotiations. On this basis, therefore, Ambassador Nomura submitted a proposal for approval by the Japanese government and subsequent delivery to the United States.[85]
[82] III, 50-51.
[83] III, 52-53.
[84] III, 54.
[85] III, 55.
[19]
By explaining the immutable policy of the Japanese government as seen in important statements issued by Prime Minister Konoye and Ministers Hiranuma, Arita, and Matsuoka, Ambassador Nomura's proposal was designed to correct any misunderstandings arising from his government's proposal. Because his document dealt only with those points included in the proposals of President Roosevelt on August 17, 1941, and did not pretend to be Japan's policy, Ambassador Nomura believed that the United States would give it careful consideration as a means of reopening Japanese-American negotiations.[86]
Emphasizing that this opportunity to readjust the strained diplomatic situation must not be lost, Ambassador Nomura requested that his proposal be given careful consideration. If the proposed meeting between the government heads were to take place in the middle of September 1941, there remained less than two months time for preliminary negotiations. Japan must necessarily select a diplomatic staff and have a ship available before that time. In view of these reasons, Ambassador Nomura urged that the matter be decided upon without delay.[87]
23. Rumors of a British-American-Russian Conference Speed Japanese Action
On August 23, 1941 Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura of newspaper reports concerning a British-American-Russian conference to be held early in September 1941. Since the United States was also reported to be shipping goods to Russia, Tokyo feared a realization of an Allied encirclement. If Japan were to arrange a conference between its leaders and the United States which would convene after the Allied meeting, the world would receive the impression that Japan had submitted to the threat of encirclement. In order to offset this reaction, Japan decided to submit an early reply to the American proposal and to arrange the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye for an earlier date. The Japanese Foreign Office also requested Ambassador Nomura to inform the United States that the shipment of materials to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters would produce an unfavorable effect on Japanese-American relations.[88]
24. Hull-Nomura Conversation (First-August 23, 1941)
(a) Secretary Hull's Report[89]
To thank Mr. Hull for arranging his interview with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura called on the American Secretary of State on August 23, 1941. The Japanese Ambassador said his government was carefully considering the American notes, and would respond in a few days. The two representatives once again stated their mutual desire to better Japanese-American relations.
Reiterating that America's basic principles consisted of peace, law, justice and equality in its dealings throughout the world, Secretary Hull declared that Japan was pursuing the opposite course. During the past months, the government-controlled Japanese press had excited distrust of the United States and had acclaimed a program of unlimited expansion in establishing the "new order" in the Pacific, while war factions headed by Mr. Matsuoka had lauded the benefits of the Tripartite Pact. Considering these facts, Secretary Hull felt that American skepticism concerning Japan's sincerity in seeking a peaceful settlement was justified.
Pointing to America's lack of cooperation in its relations with his country, Ambassador Nomura cited as an example the shipment of oil to Vladivostok through Japanese waters. Faced with large Russian forces in that area, Japan could not be expected to ignore the reinforcement of Russian military supply bases across the border line.
[86] See III, 56-62 for text of this proposal which was not adopted by the Foreign Office.
[87] III, 63.
[88] III, 64. See Japanese-American Relations, Part C, Section 172, Japan Recognizes Russo-German War as Threat to Its Border.
[89] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 23, 1941. S.D., II, 565-567.
[20]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
After mentioning jocularly Japan's non-aggression pact with Russia, which elicited no response but a laugh from Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull answered that the United States was concerned only with aiding any resistance to the German armies. Should Japan project itself militarily into the Russo-German situation, or any other situation affecting the United States, the entire situation would be changed.
To Ambassador Nomura's query regarding the future sale of oil to Japan under the freezing system, Secretary Hull replied that his knowledge of the details was incomplete, but he promised to investigate the matter.[90]
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report
There is no separate message available referring to this conversation with Secretary Hull on August 23, 1941.
25. Hull-Nomura Conversation (Second-August 23, 1941)
(a) Secretary Hull's Report[91]
Later in the day, on August 23, 1941, Ambassador Nomura returned to Secretary Hull's apartment to inform him of a message from Japan concerning the proposed meeting between the heads of the two governments. Because of the reported Allied conferences at Moscow which were scheduled for early in September, the Japanese government was desirous of effecting this meeting earlier than the date, October 15, 1941, suggested by President Roosevelt.
Ambassador Nomura laughed very heartily when Secretary Hull remarked that the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact would give Japan all the assurances of Russian peaceful intentions that Japan would desire. Regardless of its non-aggression pact with Russia, Japan feared that some agreements entered into at Moscow might be detrimental to Japanese plans and policies. Secretary Hull, however, made no commitments of any kind in regard to this proposal.
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[92]
In compliance with his orders, Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull at 5:00 P.M. Saturday afternoon, August 23, 1941, to report that Japan was prepared to make an early reply to the statement of President Roosevelt. The Japanese Ambassador further suggested that the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye be held at a date earlier than that previously proposed.
Following Tokyo's other instructions, Ambassador Nomura asked that the United States delay its Moscow conference and withhold shipment of material to Russia for the time being. Although Secretary Hull refrained from making any comment regarding Ambassador Nomura's suggestion for an early Japanese-American conference, he answered Ambassador Nomura's remarks about Russia by pointing to the Neutrality Pact in existence between Japan and Russia. Secretary Hull assured Ambassador Nomura, however, that his statement would be relayed to the President. Ambassador Nomura believed that President Roosevelt, who was anxious to receive Japan's reply, was the one most interested in holding a conference with Prince Konoye.[93]
[90] Ibid.
[91] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 23, 1941, S.D., II, 568.
[92] III, 65.
[93] Ibid.
[21]
26. Prime Minister Konoye Replies to President Roosevelt (August 26, 1941)
On August 26, 1941 the Japanese government sent Ambassador Nomura a reply to be communicated to President Roosevelt as soon as possible.[94] Expressing his satisfaction at President Roosevelt's approval of the proposed leaders' meeting, Prime Minister Konoye stated that since Japan and the United States held the key to world peace, deterioration of their relations would result in the downfall of world civilization. For this reason, Japan desired to improve the Japanese-American situation since the betterment of present conditions would achieve peace not only in the Pacific but throughout the world.
In Prime Minister Konoye's opinion, Japanese-American relations had reached a critical stage because of a lack of mutual understanding intensified by the machinations of third powers. Consequently, both Japan and the United States continually doubted and misconstrued the other's intentions. In order to eliminate these causes at their very source, Prime Minister Konoye desired to meet with President Roosevelt.[95]
Under the present circumstances in which rapid changes were constantly taking place and in which unforeseen conditions might possibly arise at any moment, Prime Minister Konoye did not believe that the previous informal negotiations were adequate any longer. It was necessary now for the two leaders to meet and discuss the possibility of saving the present situation by studying together the important questions affecting the entire Pacific area. Any minor details could then be settled by those officials specializing in such matters.
Eagerly waiting for the day of the meeting, Prime Minister Konoye urged that President Roosevelt accept the proposal in an understanding spirit. In view of various circumstances, the Japanese Prime Minister believed that the meeting should be held somewhere in the vicinity of Hawaii.[96]
27. Japan Replies to President Roosevelt's Statement of August 17, 1941
On August 26, 1941 in a statement sent to Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese government replied to President Roosevelt's note of August 17, 1941.[97] It reviewed the American claim that Japan's actions in French Indo-China had removed the basis upon which the informal conversations concerning Pacific problems had been founded. In accordance with the principles embodied in the peace program which the United States advocated, Japan had been asked to abandon its expansionist activities and change its attitude. Furthermore, in asking that Japan submit a clearer statement of its present plans, the United States had emphatically stated that it would resort to any necessary steps to prevent Japan from dominating its neighboring countries by military power.[98]
In view of its past pledges and repeated explanations of its intentions toward other countries, Japan deeply regretted American mistrust of its actions. Solely on the basis of its own fundamental conception of the Pacific problem, the United States chose to regard certain Japanese measures as harmful to peace in that area. However, in view of the international confusion permeating the entire world, Tokyo felt that it was almost impossible to judge whether a certain incident was the cause or result of the situation.
[94] III, 66.
[95] III, 67. The English translation by Ambassador Nomura was sent to Tokyo on September 3, 1941, see III, 81-83. For the text received by the State Department, see "The Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye) to President Roosevelt", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 572-573.
[96] III, 68.
[97] III, 69. For English translation by Ambassador Nomura sent to Tokyo on September 3, 1941 see III, 84-88. For text received by the State Department see "Statement by the Japanese government handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to President Roosevelt, August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 573-575.
[98] Ibid.
[22]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
One-sided judgement of the situation by the United States, based upon only certain political facts, would be harmful to lasting peace. Since Japan thought it necessary to cope with anything that threatened its own peaceful progress and its own defense, the United States, before criticizing such defensive measures, must recognize the cause and correct the situation so that peace could be established.[99]
America considered certain Japanese measures as harmful to the principles which it upheld, but on the other hand Japan felt that the United States had placed certain obstacles in the path of Japan's self-sufficiency and defense. Even during the informal conversations taking place between Japan and the United States, the American government had continuously applied a policy of pressure, thereby depriving Japan of many essential natural resources.
In the meantime many American newspaper articles and editorials predicted that the United States, Britain and the Netherlands East Indies would form an anti-Japanese front in the Far East. Although the United States might have acted in conformity with its own national requirements, this proved conclusively that actions considered to be just by one government might be detrimental to another. The United States apparently overlooked the fact that its natural circumstances and monopolistic power could well present a threat to another nation.[100]
President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull followed the course of peace, and, consequently, it was difficult for them to understand that peoples in other countries felt threatened by the United States. Yet nations less favorably situated, especially with regard to natural resources, were forced to consider their relations with the United States from a defensive viewpoint. In order to maintain peace the United States must refrain from criticizing the individual actions of other nations and instead attempt to understand the circumstances causing those actions. However, Japan was pleased that the United States had encouraged an exchange of opinions relating to the basis for an understanding which would result in lasting peace in the Pacific.[101]
In explaining its actions in the Southwest Pacific, Japan reiterated that its occupation of French Indo-China had not been taken with the intention of advancing by force into neighboring areas, but had been an act of self-defense to cope with threats against Japan's right of existence. Since the China Incident had originated from a threat to Japan's national existence, the ending of the war by the establishment of a just peace with China would find Japan willing to withdraw its troops immediately from French Indo-China. In view of this statement, Japan's attitude toward Thailand was self-evident.
Turning to the problem of Japanese-Russian relations, Tokyo gave assurance that it would refrain from military action against Russia as long as that country observed the Russo-Japanese neutrality agreement by refraining from any threats to Japan and Manchukuo. In return, Japan earnestly requested that the United States refrain from any measures which would stimulate Japan's fear of joint American-Russian action against it.[102]
Japan insisted that it whole-heartedly supported the principles laid down previously by the American government as a basis for conducting informal conversations with Japan, and agreed that their purpose was the conclusion of an understanding that would achieve a natural and peaceful settlement of problems in the Pacific area. By establishing such a peace in the Pacific, Japan joined with the United States in hoping that the principles set forth by both countries would be used towards the establishment of a world-wide peace. To maintain the necessary economical, political and military equality throughout this area, those countries which had superior natural resources and geographical locations must assume an attitude of
[99] III, 70.
[100] III, 71.
[101] III, 72.
[102] III, 73.
[23]
strict impartiality and must cooperate in the distribution of advantages to lesser nations. The spirit of reciprocity should govern any adjustments made in order to satisfy the essential requirements of all countries in that area.[103]
In summing up its reply to President Roosevelt's statement, the Japanese government expressed the opinion that the principles which it had set forth were both clear and concise. Only by conferring together dispassionately and constructively on all problems relating to the interest of both countries could the United States and Japan hope to found a lasting peace; therefore, an immediate conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye was required. First, however, it would be necessary to eliminate the false impression that such a conference was due to pressure exerted on Japan by the United States.[104]
28. Japan's Reply Contains Its Maximum Concessions
In a special message to Ambassador Nomura on August 26, 1941 the Japanese government explained that the reply outlined above contained its maximum concessions. Since both the situation in Japan itself, as well as that throughout the world was strained to the extreme, Tokyo urged Ambassador Nomura to convince the American officials of the necessity for an interview between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, on which it was pinning its last hopes. It said that such a conference would not necessarily have to be bound by the statements made in Foreign Minister Toyoda's message.[105]
(a) Secretary Hull's Report[106]
Since Ambassador Nomura had received a reply from his government regarding President Roosevelt's message to the Prime Minister of Japan,[107] Secretary Hull agreed on August 27, 1941 to arrange an interview with President Roosevelt for the next day so that in accordance with his instructions the Japanese Ambassador might present it in person. Meanwhile, both representatives further discussed the relationship between the United States and Japan, with Ambassador Nomura expressing confidence that the new Japanese note offered opportunities for a definite improvement of the situation.
When the Japanese Ambassador mentioned the matter of the two American oil tankers en route to Vladivostok, Secretary Hull immediately forestalled further protests by stating emphatically that the shipments were supported by the Japanese-Russian agreement of Portsmouth, and were as legitimate under all laws of commerce as were the much larger oil exports from this country to Japan. Admitting the strength of Secretary Hull's argument, Ambassador Nomura nevertheless insisted that agitators constantly reminded the Japanese masses that, while they were forced to use coal, American oil shipments were passing Japan en route to Russia. Secretary Hull then declared that this claim was spurious.
As a remedy, Ambassador Nomura suggested that the two Japanese tankers leaving the United States monthly be loaded with oil for his country. In reply, Secretary Hull requested that Ambassador Nomura inquire about the possibility of Japan's using its free money as payment, both in the United States and in South America. The Japanese Ambassador readily agreed to look into this matter.[108]
[103] III, 74.
[104] III, 75.
[105] III, 76. Counselor Dooman of the American Embassy in Japan was warned on August 27, 1941 by a Japanese authority that if there were any premature disclosures of the plans for a meeting of Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt at this time when American tankers were enroute to Vladivostok, attempts might be made on the lives of leading members of the Japanese government, S.D., II, 568-569.
[106] "Memorandum by the Secretary", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 569-570.
[107] III, 67-75.
[108] "Memorandum by the Secretary", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 569-570. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
[24]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
After giving Secretary Hull a copy of the statement which he was later to present to President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura expressed optimism in regard to the reaching of a satisfactory agreement between the two countries should the United States agree to concessions now being asked by the Japanese government.[109] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[110]
Ambassador Nomura reported that he had delivered Prince Konoye's message to Secretary Hull on Wednesday, August 27, 1941. After citing several points orally because the English text had not been completed, Ambassador Nomura requested that he be allowed to see President Roosevelt immediately. Secretary Hull replied that it was impossible on that day, but arrangements would be made for the next morning.
As the conversation progressed, Ambassador Nomura commented on Winston Churchill's recent speech which the Japanese Ambassador considered harmful to the international situation. Remarking that he had refrained from making any comments on the speech to inquiring members of the press, the Secretary of State mentioned the extremist views that were being expressed at present by various Japanese publications.[111]
In accordance with the directions of his government Ambassador Nomura also spoke of the unfavorable effect that United States' petroleum shipments to Russia had had upon the Japanese public.[112] Secretary Hull brought out graphs to show the enormous amount of oil that had been furnished to Japan, and compared it with the comparatively small percentage shipped to Russia. Nevertheless, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that the shipment of this oil to Russia by way of Japanese waters had directly followed the embargo of all American exports to Japan and as a result Japanese public opinion had been disturbed.
Since the freezing of Japanese funds throughout the United States would impede the use of export permits even if they were granted by the United States, Secretary Hull suggested that the Japanese government pay for the desired oil from money invested in South America. Believing that there was no other solution but to use this South American money, the Japanese Ambassador requested that Tokyo discuss the matter thoroughly and advise him of any action to be taken.[113]
Two days later on August 29, 1941 Ambassador Nomura again urged that Tokyo immediately purchase the petroleum needed by Japan with funds which were outside of the area affected by the freezing order.[114] According to Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull was cognizant of the delicate nature of Japanese-American relations, and was aware that a single disturbing incident could be disastrous. Yet Secretary Hull felt that Japan was making a great problem over the shipment of a few hundred thousand barrels of oil to Russia when, even in the face of popular disapproval, the American government had already exported several million barrels of oil to Japan.
[109] "Memorandum of a conversation", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 571.
[110] III, 77.
[111] Ibid. Prime Minister Winston Churchill warns Japan in a world-wide broadcast from London on August 24, 1941 that its aggression in the Far East "has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. But . . . if these hopes should fail, we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States."—Facts on File Yearbook, 1941, Vol. I, 340.
[112] III, 78
[113] III, 79.
[114] III, 80.
[25]
Referring to the freedom of seas, the Secretary of State explained that he had no desire to permit a third country to interfere with Japanese-American trade. However, Ambassador Nomura explained that the shipment of oil, now unavailable to Japan, through Japanese territorial waters to Vladivostok presented a major problem from the standpoint of Japanese national feeling. Apparently Secretary Hull saw the logic of this remark, for a few days later American newspapers mentioned the possible routing of oil through the Persian Gulf.[115]
29. Mr. Terasaki Requests Ambassador Grew to Recall American Oil Shipments
Meanwhile, the problems evolving from the United States' shipping oil to Vladivostok were similarly discussed in Japan.[116] After emphasizing the grave internal situation then existing in Japan, on August 27, 1941, Mr. Terasaki, Director of the American Bureau for Japanese Foreign Affairs, delivered to Counselor Dooman an oral statement for Ambassador Grew, which asked that the American tankers now en route to Russia be recalled. If this were impossible, Mr. Terasaki suggested that the ships be rerouted to avoid their passing through the Straits of Saya and Tsugaru, for, in spite of Japan's non-aggression pact with Russia, the Japanese strongly resented the sending of supplies which might possibly be used against them by Russia.[117]
30. Roosevelt-Nomura Conference (August 28, 1941)
(a) Secretary Hull's Report
On August 28, 1941 Ambassador Nomura called on President Roosevelt to deliver a personal message from the Prime Minister of Japan,[119] and also to submit a reply from the Japanese government regarding President Roosevelt's communication of August 17, 1941.[120] President Roosevelt read Prince Konoye's message with interest and complimented its tone. In speaking of the proposed conference mentioned in Prince Konoye's message, President Roosevelt suggested that, because of the time element involved, Juneau, Alaska might be a better meeting place than Hawaii. The Japanese Ambassador was interested principally in having the conversation held as early as possible.
Turning next to the reply from the Japanese government, which Ambassador Nomura also submitted at this time, the President noted briefly that it did not provide for the discontinuation of Japanese army and naval reinforcements in the Indo-Chinese area while peace conversations were in progress. In addition, Mr. Roosevelt, criticizing Japan's baseless fear of attack by Russia and its unjustified complaints about oil shipments, reminded Ambassador Nomura that Japan was now in a position to load a number of oilers to transport fuel to its home ports whenever it desired.
After concluding his reading of the Japanese note, President Roosevelt advised Ambassador Nomura that he considered it to be a step forward and, thus, was very hopeful. He mentioned again his interest in spending three or four days with Prince Konoye, possibly at Juneau.[121]
[115] Ibid.
[116] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 568-569.
[117] Ibid.
[118] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 571-572.
[119] S.D., II, 572-573. For translation by American cryptanalysts of text sent from Tokyo to Washington on August 26, 1941 see III, 67-68. For English text of this document sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura in code on September 3, 1941 see III, 81-83.
[120] S.D., II, 573-575. For translation by American cryptanalysts of text sent from Tokyo to Washington on August 26, 1941 see III, 69-75. For English text sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura on September 3, 1941 see III, 84-88.
[121] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 571-572.
[26]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[122]
In accordance with instructions from Tokyo, on August 28, 1941 at 11:00 A.M. Ambassador Nomura met with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to present the English text of the Japanese reply to the President's message of August 17, 1941.[123]
While reading the messages President Roosevelt commended their contents in flattering terms, but in discussing the points pertaining to discrimination, President Roosevelt "cynically" inquired whether an invasion of Thailand would take place during his conference with Prince Konoye just as the invasion of French Indo-China had occurred during Secretary Hull's conversations with Ambassador Nomura. Nevertheless, President Roosevelt assured Ambassador Nomura that he was looking forward to approximately three days of conversation with Prince Konoye.
The main problem stemmed from the choice of a meeting place. Because the American President, unlike the Japanese Prime Minister who could appoint an acting minister to handle such matters, could not designate the Vice President to sign bills from Congress during his absence,[124] a three weeks round trip to Hawaii would take too much time, whereas a trip to Juneau would consume only 14 days.
Ambassador Nomura declared that as far as Japan was concerned the question of a meeting place was secondary, but it was desired to have the conference take place at the earliest possible date. Though he did not object to this request, President Roosevelt did not suggest a definite time.
President Roosevelt added that the recent meeting with Prime Minister Churchill had been postponed on account of the Balkan War, and that the meeting was then held after Congress had approved it.[125]
31. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 28, 1941)
(a) State Department's Report[126]
Calling at Secretary Hull's apartment after his interview with President Roosevelt earlier in the same day, August 28, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that he was much encouraged regarding the attempts to improve relations between the two countries. Since Japan was desirous only that the conference be held at an early date, preferably between September 21 and September 25, 1941, to offset Japanese press attacks against the United States, President Roosevelt's suggestion that the conference be held at Juneau, Alaska would probably be approved by Prime Minister Konoye. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that Prince Konoye would probably be accompanied by a staff of twenty representatives from the Foreign Office, the Army, the Navy, and the Japanese Embassy in Washington. This would be very advantageous in that the Japanese Army and Navy representatives would be equally responsible for any settlement reached. An agreement on publicity concerning the conference would have to be reached by the two governments, especially since the Prime Minister would have to leave Tokyo five days before President Roosevelt left Washington.[127]
[122] III, 89.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid.
[125] III, 90.
[126] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 576-579.
[127] Ibid.
[27]
After promising to refer these points to President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull mentioned the questions that would inevitably arise at such a conference. In his opinion the actual conference should serve only to ratify matters of importance already agreed to in principle. Reference was made to certain difficulties encountered in the previous informal conversations which had caused delays and had finally resulted in Japan's acting at variance with the spirit of the conversations. In addition, it would be unwise to have a split in the Japanese Diet over the question of peace.
Recognizing the merits of Secretary Hull's remarks, Ambassador Nomura then summed up the three major difficulties encountered in their conversations: Japan's relations with the Axis; the retention of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia; and the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. Only in regard to the stationing of Japanese forces in North China did the Japanese Ambassador anticipate any trouble. Concerning Japan's relations with the Axis, Ambassador Nomura was confident that as long as America's attitude of self-protection remained reasonable and it did not demand a nullification of the Tripartite Pact by requesting a blanket guarantee from Japan for any action it took against Germany in the name of self-defense, no breach would occur between the two countries.
Secretary Hull commented that Mr. Matsuoka's constant stressing of Japan's alignment with the Axis and the inopportune time chosen for the signing of the Tripartite Pact had already produced an unfavorable effect on America. Unless something were done to counteract the unfavorable impression, it would prove a source of embarrassment to President Roosevelt upon his return from the proposed meeting with Prince Konoye, for as an indication of its current relations with Germany, the United States was already maintaining patrols all the way to Iceland.[128]
At this point, Ambassador Nomura discussed the United States' position in aiding in the settlement of the Chinese situation and commented that Japan preferred to have the United States use its influence to bring Japan and China together to settle their own difficulties rather than have the United States discuss the basic peace terms with Japan. Secretary Hull made it clear, however, that before exercising its good offices between China and Japan, the United States would first consider the basic terms on which Japan proposed to negotiate, since it was necessary to have the friendship and confidence of the Chinese government before and after the negotiations. Both America and Japan, he felt, should consider the potentialities of China as a trading nation.
Ambassador Nomura agreed that the Chinese question was important, but remarked that there were other questions which could be settled at the conference in order to tide over a critical situation. Since the China Incident was one of the major questions calling for settlement, Secretary Hull believed that unless a conciliation were reached in this regard, it would remain the root of future instability. Ambassador Nomura recognized the soundness of this statement, particularly in view of the French Indo-China situation. Mr. Ballantine pointed out that Japan had promised to remove its troops from that area as soon as the China affair was settled.
After recapitulating briefly Secretary Hull's statements to make sure that he understood them, Ambassador Nomura left after commenting that he did not know how far the Japanese government could go in view of internal political difficulties, but Prince Konoye as a man of great courage was willing to assume great risks to improve relations.[129]
[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid.
18. Mr. Dooman Confers with Mr. Terasaki
On August 18, 1941 at 3:00 P.M. Mr. Terasaki, Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, requested Mr. Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of the American Embassy in Tokyo, to convey a private message to Ambassador Grew.[74] Stressing the importance of the interview to be held that afternoon at 4:00 P.M., between the Japanese Foreign Minister and Ambassador Grew, Mr. Terasaki's note expressed the hope that the meeting would initiate a series of conversations for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations for he believed that if the Cabinet under Prince Konoye failed in this objective, all hope of reconciliation would be lost. He urged that criticism of the actions and policies of either government be avoided, and warned that though the Japanese government was ready to respond to any proposal of the United States to end the Far Eastern conflict, Japan would under no circumstances give in to American pressure.
Requesting Mr. Dooman to inform Ambassador Grew that there was much optimism in all influential quarters with regard to the outcome of the conversations, Mr. Terasaki hoped that the American Ambassador would do everything possible to achieve the desired results. The conversations were to be "off the record", by which Mr. Terasaki meant that there would be no commitment on either side in regard to any question arising during the conversations.[75]
19. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (August 18, 1941)
(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[76]
Ambassador Grew called on Foreign Minister Toyoda at the latter's request at 4:00 P.M. on August 18, 1941. After first receiving assurance from Ambassador Grew that the matters under discussion would be treated with the greatest secrecy,[77] and that no reports would reach Germany or Italy, Admiral Toyoda began a long oral statement requiring two hours and a half for delivery, regarding the critical situation then existing between Japan and the United States. Declaring that Japan had moved troops into French Indo-China solely for the purpose of settling the China affair, Foreign Minister Toyoda insisted that Japan had been acting under its own initiative and that there was no basis for the drastic economic measures which the United States had taken against his country under the mistaken belief that Japan was acting at the instigation of Germany.
Japanese public opinion had become extremely excited but the government was doing all in its power to repress hostile press comment. Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that the Japanese reply to the President's proposal of July 24, 1941 had been carefully drafted to meet the intentions of the American government, and that it contained proposals which would bind both governments. However, since the President's proposal had dealt exclusively with the joint defense of Indo-China, the Japanese reply was also restricted to that subject and would deal with it independently of the Hull-Nomura conversations.
On August 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had received from Secretary Hull the American reply to the Japanese proposal, and the Japanese authorities were disturbed to note in it that the United States had attached little importance to Japan's answer to President Roosevelt's proposal. The American proposal had suggested the withdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indo-China as a prerequisite, although Japan had promised to withdraw after the China Incident was settled.
If the United States wanted peace in the Pacific, Japan suggested that America cooperate in settling the China Incident. Both Japanese and American statesmen were sincerely striving
[74] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", initialled by Eugene H. Dooman, August 18, 1941, S.D., II, 559-560.
[75] Ibid.
[76] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", August 18, 1941,
[77] S.D., II, 560-564.
[17]
for peace, according to the Japanese Foreign Minister, and to have a breakdown of peace occur now would be evidence of lack of statesmanship on both sides.
Both countries had a duty to save the world from disaster, and for this reason they must consider their mutual problems in a calm and friendly atmosphere on an equal basis.
Because present relations were extremely strained as a result of misunderstandings on both sides and sinister designs by other countries, it would be most opportune if the leaders of both countries could meet at Honolulu to discuss the situation in person.
Foreign Minister Toyoda said that he intended to have Ambassador Nomura see President Roosevelt in person to make this suggestion, and he requested Ambassador Grew to support this plan, which was unprecedented in Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Japanese history, since it involved the Premier's going abroad and would be done despite the objections of certain Japanese elements.
The Japanese Foreign Minister assured Ambassador Grew that the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, would make every effort to save the world from ruin and to maintain peace in the Pacific, and he expressed his conviction that President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye would be able to reach an equitable agreement since Japan was not necessarily bound by the reply made on August 6 by Ambassador Nomura to President Roosevelt's proposal of July 24, 1941. Foreign Minister Toyoda also stressed the necessity for avoiding any impression that Japan had entered into negotiations with the United States because of American pressure. He suggested, therefore, that both countries reciprocate in stopping or moderating various measures of economic pressure.
In his report Ambassador Grew reiterated that he realized the great need for secrecy in this matter, and indicated that he appreciated the reasons for Japan's negotiating through Ambassador Nomura in the United States rather than in Tokyo. However, he informed Foreign Minister Toyoda that in view of Japan's progressive southward advance, the United States could be governed only by Japan's actions and not by its words. He also pointed out that previously Japan had ascribed its move into Indo-China as a reaction against encirclement by other powers but now it was ascribing it to the settling of the China affair. The Japanese Foreign Minister made no comment on the remarks of the American Ambassador.
Ambassador Grew restated Mr. Hull's opinion expressed by Mr. Welles on July 23, 1941 that there appeared to be no basis for continuing the conversations which had been carried on in Washington between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura. He also spoke of Mr. Hull's statement to Ambassador Nomura on August 8, 1941 that the answer of Japan to the proposal of President Roosevelt failed in responsiveness. Though withholding official comment until the American government had time to study the proposal just made by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Ambassador Grew promised to give it his personal support,.[78]
(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report
It is believed that no detailed report of the conversation between Foreign Minister Toyoda and Ambassador Grew was forwarded to the Japanese Embassy at Washington. However, on August 21, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Minister briefly referred to this conversation in a message to Ambassador Nomura.[79]
Pointing out that if Japan and the United States were to surmount the crisis confronting them at present, it would be necessary to display real statesmanship, and reminding Ambassador Grew of his nine years of tireless work to maintain Japanese-American friendship, Foreign Minister Toyoda again strongly urged that the proposed conference of the leaders of the two nations take place.[80]
[78] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", August 18, 1941, S.D., II 560-564.
[79] III, 49.
[80] Ibid.
[81] "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State", August 18, 1941, S.D., II, 565.
[18]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
20. Ambassador Grew Urges Consideration of Japanese Proposal
In a report to Secretary Hull and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, Ambassador Grew urged that the new Japanese proposal be given the utmost consideration, since not only was such a suggestion unprecedented in Japanese history, but it indicated that Japan's intransigence had not completely crystallized. Furthermore, Ambassador Grew believed that a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt would be of incalculable value in bringing peace in the Pacific.[81]
21. Ambassador Nomura Is Convinced of President Roosevelt's Sincerity
On August 20, 1941 Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo that in a recent conversation Postmaster-General Walker had stressed the fact that President Roosevelt had taken up the question of the proposed Japanese-American conferences immediately upon his return to Washington. Furthermore, by his past speeches and most recent statement, it was evident that President Roosevelt had a broad-minded view of the world situation and was in no way anti-Japanese in his feelings, and, therefore, Japan should reciprocate in a like manner.
When Ambassador Nomura responded that it was with strong resolution that the Japanese government had continued its dealings with the current problem, Mr. Walker emphasized that this was also true of President Roosevelt for even if there were no real justification, there was much anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States. If news of the proposed conference were to leak out, Congress would undoubtedly raise strong opposition to it. On the other hand, there was a great possibility of achieving peace in the Pacific, if the conference succeeded. In view of President Roosevelt's present feeling, Mr. Walker asked that a way be found to settle successfully the Japanese-American question.[82]
On the following day, August 21, 1941, Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo of further indications of President Roosevelt's serious interest in the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations. According to rumors, the text of the note delivered to Ambassador Nomura on August 17, 1941[83] had been composed by President Roosevelt himself, and the President expected that a Japanese reply would be handed directly to him.
With this in mind, Ambassador Nomura was of the opinion that the Japanese reply should be in simple and direct phraseology. Referring to the text of his proposed reply to President Roosevelt's note, Ambassador Nomura decided to omit such expressions as "continuance of encirclement" and "of discrimination of boycott and barriers of personal integrities and attack." At the same time, however, Ambassador Nomura felt it essential that Japan emphasize the necessity of guaranteeing the safety of the Far East.[84]
22. Ambassador Nomura Suggests A New Proposal
In a message to Tokyo on August 20, 1941 Ambassador Nomura expressed the opinion that President Roosevelt, desirous of settling Japanese-American problems by a conference between the two government heads, had made this proposal as his last political move at the critical moment when Japanese-American relations were at their worst. Urging that Japan respond to the generous spirit exhibited by President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura asked Tokyo to leave decisions concerning concrete points in the proposals until some future date, thereby showing the American government that Japan would allow nothing to conflict with the successful resumption of the informal negotiations. On this basis, therefore, Ambassador Nomura submitted a proposal for approval by the Japanese government and subsequent delivery to the United States.[85]
[82] III, 50-51.
[83] III, 52-53.
[84] III, 54.
[85] III, 55.
[19]
By explaining the immutable policy of the Japanese government as seen in important statements issued by Prime Minister Konoye and Ministers Hiranuma, Arita, and Matsuoka, Ambassador Nomura's proposal was designed to correct any misunderstandings arising from his government's proposal. Because his document dealt only with those points included in the proposals of President Roosevelt on August 17, 1941, and did not pretend to be Japan's policy, Ambassador Nomura believed that the United States would give it careful consideration as a means of reopening Japanese-American negotiations.[86]
Emphasizing that this opportunity to readjust the strained diplomatic situation must not be lost, Ambassador Nomura requested that his proposal be given careful consideration. If the proposed meeting between the government heads were to take place in the middle of September 1941, there remained less than two months time for preliminary negotiations. Japan must necessarily select a diplomatic staff and have a ship available before that time. In view of these reasons, Ambassador Nomura urged that the matter be decided upon without delay.[87]
23. Rumors of a British-American-Russian Conference Speed Japanese Action
On August 23, 1941 Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura of newspaper reports concerning a British-American-Russian conference to be held early in September 1941. Since the United States was also reported to be shipping goods to Russia, Tokyo feared a realization of an Allied encirclement. If Japan were to arrange a conference between its leaders and the United States which would convene after the Allied meeting, the world would receive the impression that Japan had submitted to the threat of encirclement. In order to offset this reaction, Japan decided to submit an early reply to the American proposal and to arrange the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye for an earlier date. The Japanese Foreign Office also requested Ambassador Nomura to inform the United States that the shipment of materials to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters would produce an unfavorable effect on Japanese-American relations.[88]
24. Hull-Nomura Conversation (First-August 23, 1941)
(a) Secretary Hull's Report[89]
To thank Mr. Hull for arranging his interview with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura called on the American Secretary of State on August 23, 1941. The Japanese Ambassador said his government was carefully considering the American notes, and would respond in a few days. The two representatives once again stated their mutual desire to better Japanese-American relations.
Reiterating that America's basic principles consisted of peace, law, justice and equality in its dealings throughout the world, Secretary Hull declared that Japan was pursuing the opposite course. During the past months, the government-controlled Japanese press had excited distrust of the United States and had acclaimed a program of unlimited expansion in establishing the "new order" in the Pacific, while war factions headed by Mr. Matsuoka had lauded the benefits of the Tripartite Pact. Considering these facts, Secretary Hull felt that American skepticism concerning Japan's sincerity in seeking a peaceful settlement was justified.
Pointing to America's lack of cooperation in its relations with his country, Ambassador Nomura cited as an example the shipment of oil to Vladivostok through Japanese waters. Faced with large Russian forces in that area, Japan could not be expected to ignore the reinforcement of Russian military supply bases across the border line.
[86] See III, 56-62 for text of this proposal which was not adopted by the Foreign Office.
[87] III, 63.
[88] III, 64. See Japanese-American Relations, Part C, Section 172, Japan Recognizes Russo-German War as Threat to Its Border.
[89] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 23, 1941. S.D., II, 565-567.
[20]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
After mentioning jocularly Japan's non-aggression pact with Russia, which elicited no response but a laugh from Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull answered that the United States was concerned only with aiding any resistance to the German armies. Should Japan project itself militarily into the Russo-German situation, or any other situation affecting the United States, the entire situation would be changed.
To Ambassador Nomura's query regarding the future sale of oil to Japan under the freezing system, Secretary Hull replied that his knowledge of the details was incomplete, but he promised to investigate the matter.[90]
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report
There is no separate message available referring to this conversation with Secretary Hull on August 23, 1941.
25. Hull-Nomura Conversation (Second-August 23, 1941)
(a) Secretary Hull's Report[91]
Later in the day, on August 23, 1941, Ambassador Nomura returned to Secretary Hull's apartment to inform him of a message from Japan concerning the proposed meeting between the heads of the two governments. Because of the reported Allied conferences at Moscow which were scheduled for early in September, the Japanese government was desirous of effecting this meeting earlier than the date, October 15, 1941, suggested by President Roosevelt.
Ambassador Nomura laughed very heartily when Secretary Hull remarked that the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact would give Japan all the assurances of Russian peaceful intentions that Japan would desire. Regardless of its non-aggression pact with Russia, Japan feared that some agreements entered into at Moscow might be detrimental to Japanese plans and policies. Secretary Hull, however, made no commitments of any kind in regard to this proposal.
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[92]
In compliance with his orders, Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull at 5:00 P.M. Saturday afternoon, August 23, 1941, to report that Japan was prepared to make an early reply to the statement of President Roosevelt. The Japanese Ambassador further suggested that the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye be held at a date earlier than that previously proposed.
Following Tokyo's other instructions, Ambassador Nomura asked that the United States delay its Moscow conference and withhold shipment of material to Russia for the time being. Although Secretary Hull refrained from making any comment regarding Ambassador Nomura's suggestion for an early Japanese-American conference, he answered Ambassador Nomura's remarks about Russia by pointing to the Neutrality Pact in existence between Japan and Russia. Secretary Hull assured Ambassador Nomura, however, that his statement would be relayed to the President. Ambassador Nomura believed that President Roosevelt, who was anxious to receive Japan's reply, was the one most interested in holding a conference with Prince Konoye.[93]
[90] Ibid.
[91] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 23, 1941, S.D., II, 568.
[92] III, 65.
[93] Ibid.
[21]
26. Prime Minister Konoye Replies to President Roosevelt (August 26, 1941)
On August 26, 1941 the Japanese government sent Ambassador Nomura a reply to be communicated to President Roosevelt as soon as possible.[94] Expressing his satisfaction at President Roosevelt's approval of the proposed leaders' meeting, Prime Minister Konoye stated that since Japan and the United States held the key to world peace, deterioration of their relations would result in the downfall of world civilization. For this reason, Japan desired to improve the Japanese-American situation since the betterment of present conditions would achieve peace not only in the Pacific but throughout the world.
In Prime Minister Konoye's opinion, Japanese-American relations had reached a critical stage because of a lack of mutual understanding intensified by the machinations of third powers. Consequently, both Japan and the United States continually doubted and misconstrued the other's intentions. In order to eliminate these causes at their very source, Prime Minister Konoye desired to meet with President Roosevelt.[95]
Under the present circumstances in which rapid changes were constantly taking place and in which unforeseen conditions might possibly arise at any moment, Prime Minister Konoye did not believe that the previous informal negotiations were adequate any longer. It was necessary now for the two leaders to meet and discuss the possibility of saving the present situation by studying together the important questions affecting the entire Pacific area. Any minor details could then be settled by those officials specializing in such matters.
Eagerly waiting for the day of the meeting, Prime Minister Konoye urged that President Roosevelt accept the proposal in an understanding spirit. In view of various circumstances, the Japanese Prime Minister believed that the meeting should be held somewhere in the vicinity of Hawaii.[96]
27. Japan Replies to President Roosevelt's Statement of August 17, 1941
On August 26, 1941 in a statement sent to Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese government replied to President Roosevelt's note of August 17, 1941.[97] It reviewed the American claim that Japan's actions in French Indo-China had removed the basis upon which the informal conversations concerning Pacific problems had been founded. In accordance with the principles embodied in the peace program which the United States advocated, Japan had been asked to abandon its expansionist activities and change its attitude. Furthermore, in asking that Japan submit a clearer statement of its present plans, the United States had emphatically stated that it would resort to any necessary steps to prevent Japan from dominating its neighboring countries by military power.[98]
In view of its past pledges and repeated explanations of its intentions toward other countries, Japan deeply regretted American mistrust of its actions. Solely on the basis of its own fundamental conception of the Pacific problem, the United States chose to regard certain Japanese measures as harmful to peace in that area. However, in view of the international confusion permeating the entire world, Tokyo felt that it was almost impossible to judge whether a certain incident was the cause or result of the situation.
[94] III, 66.
[95] III, 67. The English translation by Ambassador Nomura was sent to Tokyo on September 3, 1941, see III, 81-83. For the text received by the State Department, see "The Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye) to President Roosevelt", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 572-573.
[96] III, 68.
[97] III, 69. For English translation by Ambassador Nomura sent to Tokyo on September 3, 1941 see III, 84-88. For text received by the State Department see "Statement by the Japanese government handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to President Roosevelt, August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 573-575.
[98] Ibid.
[22]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
One-sided judgement of the situation by the United States, based upon only certain political facts, would be harmful to lasting peace. Since Japan thought it necessary to cope with anything that threatened its own peaceful progress and its own defense, the United States, before criticizing such defensive measures, must recognize the cause and correct the situation so that peace could be established.[99]
America considered certain Japanese measures as harmful to the principles which it upheld, but on the other hand Japan felt that the United States had placed certain obstacles in the path of Japan's self-sufficiency and defense. Even during the informal conversations taking place between Japan and the United States, the American government had continuously applied a policy of pressure, thereby depriving Japan of many essential natural resources.
In the meantime many American newspaper articles and editorials predicted that the United States, Britain and the Netherlands East Indies would form an anti-Japanese front in the Far East. Although the United States might have acted in conformity with its own national requirements, this proved conclusively that actions considered to be just by one government might be detrimental to another. The United States apparently overlooked the fact that its natural circumstances and monopolistic power could well present a threat to another nation.[100]
President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull followed the course of peace, and, consequently, it was difficult for them to understand that peoples in other countries felt threatened by the United States. Yet nations less favorably situated, especially with regard to natural resources, were forced to consider their relations with the United States from a defensive viewpoint. In order to maintain peace the United States must refrain from criticizing the individual actions of other nations and instead attempt to understand the circumstances causing those actions. However, Japan was pleased that the United States had encouraged an exchange of opinions relating to the basis for an understanding which would result in lasting peace in the Pacific.[101]
In explaining its actions in the Southwest Pacific, Japan reiterated that its occupation of French Indo-China had not been taken with the intention of advancing by force into neighboring areas, but had been an act of self-defense to cope with threats against Japan's right of existence. Since the China Incident had originated from a threat to Japan's national existence, the ending of the war by the establishment of a just peace with China would find Japan willing to withdraw its troops immediately from French Indo-China. In view of this statement, Japan's attitude toward Thailand was self-evident.
Turning to the problem of Japanese-Russian relations, Tokyo gave assurance that it would refrain from military action against Russia as long as that country observed the Russo-Japanese neutrality agreement by refraining from any threats to Japan and Manchukuo. In return, Japan earnestly requested that the United States refrain from any measures which would stimulate Japan's fear of joint American-Russian action against it.[102]
Japan insisted that it whole-heartedly supported the principles laid down previously by the American government as a basis for conducting informal conversations with Japan, and agreed that their purpose was the conclusion of an understanding that would achieve a natural and peaceful settlement of problems in the Pacific area. By establishing such a peace in the Pacific, Japan joined with the United States in hoping that the principles set forth by both countries would be used towards the establishment of a world-wide peace. To maintain the necessary economical, political and military equality throughout this area, those countries which had superior natural resources and geographical locations must assume an attitude of
[99] III, 70.
[100] III, 71.
[101] III, 72.
[102] III, 73.
[23]
strict impartiality and must cooperate in the distribution of advantages to lesser nations. The spirit of reciprocity should govern any adjustments made in order to satisfy the essential requirements of all countries in that area.[103]
In summing up its reply to President Roosevelt's statement, the Japanese government expressed the opinion that the principles which it had set forth were both clear and concise. Only by conferring together dispassionately and constructively on all problems relating to the interest of both countries could the United States and Japan hope to found a lasting peace; therefore, an immediate conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye was required. First, however, it would be necessary to eliminate the false impression that such a conference was due to pressure exerted on Japan by the United States.[104]
28. Japan's Reply Contains Its Maximum Concessions
In a special message to Ambassador Nomura on August 26, 1941 the Japanese government explained that the reply outlined above contained its maximum concessions. Since both the situation in Japan itself, as well as that throughout the world was strained to the extreme, Tokyo urged Ambassador Nomura to convince the American officials of the necessity for an interview between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, on which it was pinning its last hopes. It said that such a conference would not necessarily have to be bound by the statements made in Foreign Minister Toyoda's message.[105]
(a) Secretary Hull's Report[106]
Since Ambassador Nomura had received a reply from his government regarding President Roosevelt's message to the Prime Minister of Japan,[107] Secretary Hull agreed on August 27, 1941 to arrange an interview with President Roosevelt for the next day so that in accordance with his instructions the Japanese Ambassador might present it in person. Meanwhile, both representatives further discussed the relationship between the United States and Japan, with Ambassador Nomura expressing confidence that the new Japanese note offered opportunities for a definite improvement of the situation.
When the Japanese Ambassador mentioned the matter of the two American oil tankers en route to Vladivostok, Secretary Hull immediately forestalled further protests by stating emphatically that the shipments were supported by the Japanese-Russian agreement of Portsmouth, and were as legitimate under all laws of commerce as were the much larger oil exports from this country to Japan. Admitting the strength of Secretary Hull's argument, Ambassador Nomura nevertheless insisted that agitators constantly reminded the Japanese masses that, while they were forced to use coal, American oil shipments were passing Japan en route to Russia. Secretary Hull then declared that this claim was spurious.
As a remedy, Ambassador Nomura suggested that the two Japanese tankers leaving the United States monthly be loaded with oil for his country. In reply, Secretary Hull requested that Ambassador Nomura inquire about the possibility of Japan's using its free money as payment, both in the United States and in South America. The Japanese Ambassador readily agreed to look into this matter.[108]
[103] III, 74.
[104] III, 75.
[105] III, 76. Counselor Dooman of the American Embassy in Japan was warned on August 27, 1941 by a Japanese authority that if there were any premature disclosures of the plans for a meeting of Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt at this time when American tankers were enroute to Vladivostok, attempts might be made on the lives of leading members of the Japanese government, S.D., II, 568-569.
[106] "Memorandum by the Secretary", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 569-570.
[107] III, 67-75.
[108] "Memorandum by the Secretary", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 569-570. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
[24]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
After giving Secretary Hull a copy of the statement which he was later to present to President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura expressed optimism in regard to the reaching of a satisfactory agreement between the two countries should the United States agree to concessions now being asked by the Japanese government.[109] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[110]
Ambassador Nomura reported that he had delivered Prince Konoye's message to Secretary Hull on Wednesday, August 27, 1941. After citing several points orally because the English text had not been completed, Ambassador Nomura requested that he be allowed to see President Roosevelt immediately. Secretary Hull replied that it was impossible on that day, but arrangements would be made for the next morning.
As the conversation progressed, Ambassador Nomura commented on Winston Churchill's recent speech which the Japanese Ambassador considered harmful to the international situation. Remarking that he had refrained from making any comments on the speech to inquiring members of the press, the Secretary of State mentioned the extremist views that were being expressed at present by various Japanese publications.[111]
In accordance with the directions of his government Ambassador Nomura also spoke of the unfavorable effect that United States' petroleum shipments to Russia had had upon the Japanese public.[112] Secretary Hull brought out graphs to show the enormous amount of oil that had been furnished to Japan, and compared it with the comparatively small percentage shipped to Russia. Nevertheless, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that the shipment of this oil to Russia by way of Japanese waters had directly followed the embargo of all American exports to Japan and as a result Japanese public opinion had been disturbed.
Since the freezing of Japanese funds throughout the United States would impede the use of export permits even if they were granted by the United States, Secretary Hull suggested that the Japanese government pay for the desired oil from money invested in South America. Believing that there was no other solution but to use this South American money, the Japanese Ambassador requested that Tokyo discuss the matter thoroughly and advise him of any action to be taken.[113]
Two days later on August 29, 1941 Ambassador Nomura again urged that Tokyo immediately purchase the petroleum needed by Japan with funds which were outside of the area affected by the freezing order.[114] According to Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull was cognizant of the delicate nature of Japanese-American relations, and was aware that a single disturbing incident could be disastrous. Yet Secretary Hull felt that Japan was making a great problem over the shipment of a few hundred thousand barrels of oil to Russia when, even in the face of popular disapproval, the American government had already exported several million barrels of oil to Japan.
[109] "Memorandum of a conversation", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 571.
[110] III, 77.
[111] Ibid. Prime Minister Winston Churchill warns Japan in a world-wide broadcast from London on August 24, 1941 that its aggression in the Far East "has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. But . . . if these hopes should fail, we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States."—Facts on File Yearbook, 1941, Vol. I, 340.
[112] III, 78
[113] III, 79.
[114] III, 80.
[25]
Referring to the freedom of seas, the Secretary of State explained that he had no desire to permit a third country to interfere with Japanese-American trade. However, Ambassador Nomura explained that the shipment of oil, now unavailable to Japan, through Japanese territorial waters to Vladivostok presented a major problem from the standpoint of Japanese national feeling. Apparently Secretary Hull saw the logic of this remark, for a few days later American newspapers mentioned the possible routing of oil through the Persian Gulf.[115]
29. Mr. Terasaki Requests Ambassador Grew to Recall American Oil Shipments
Meanwhile, the problems evolving from the United States' shipping oil to Vladivostok were similarly discussed in Japan.[116] After emphasizing the grave internal situation then existing in Japan, on August 27, 1941, Mr. Terasaki, Director of the American Bureau for Japanese Foreign Affairs, delivered to Counselor Dooman an oral statement for Ambassador Grew, which asked that the American tankers now en route to Russia be recalled. If this were impossible, Mr. Terasaki suggested that the ships be rerouted to avoid their passing through the Straits of Saya and Tsugaru, for, in spite of Japan's non-aggression pact with Russia, the Japanese strongly resented the sending of supplies which might possibly be used against them by Russia.[117]
30. Roosevelt-Nomura Conference (August 28, 1941)
(a) Secretary Hull's Report
On August 28, 1941 Ambassador Nomura called on President Roosevelt to deliver a personal message from the Prime Minister of Japan,[119] and also to submit a reply from the Japanese government regarding President Roosevelt's communication of August 17, 1941.[120] President Roosevelt read Prince Konoye's message with interest and complimented its tone. In speaking of the proposed conference mentioned in Prince Konoye's message, President Roosevelt suggested that, because of the time element involved, Juneau, Alaska might be a better meeting place than Hawaii. The Japanese Ambassador was interested principally in having the conversation held as early as possible.
Turning next to the reply from the Japanese government, which Ambassador Nomura also submitted at this time, the President noted briefly that it did not provide for the discontinuation of Japanese army and naval reinforcements in the Indo-Chinese area while peace conversations were in progress. In addition, Mr. Roosevelt, criticizing Japan's baseless fear of attack by Russia and its unjustified complaints about oil shipments, reminded Ambassador Nomura that Japan was now in a position to load a number of oilers to transport fuel to its home ports whenever it desired.
After concluding his reading of the Japanese note, President Roosevelt advised Ambassador Nomura that he considered it to be a step forward and, thus, was very hopeful. He mentioned again his interest in spending three or four days with Prince Konoye, possibly at Juneau.[121]
[115] Ibid.
[116] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 568-569.
[117] Ibid.
[118] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 571-572.
[119] S.D., II, 572-573. For translation by American cryptanalysts of text sent from Tokyo to Washington on August 26, 1941 see III, 67-68. For English text of this document sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura in code on September 3, 1941 see III, 81-83.
[120] S.D., II, 573-575. For translation by American cryptanalysts of text sent from Tokyo to Washington on August 26, 1941 see III, 69-75. For English text sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura on September 3, 1941 see III, 84-88.
[121] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 571-572.
[26]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[122]
In accordance with instructions from Tokyo, on August 28, 1941 at 11:00 A.M. Ambassador Nomura met with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to present the English text of the Japanese reply to the President's message of August 17, 1941.[123]
While reading the messages President Roosevelt commended their contents in flattering terms, but in discussing the points pertaining to discrimination, President Roosevelt "cynically" inquired whether an invasion of Thailand would take place during his conference with Prince Konoye just as the invasion of French Indo-China had occurred during Secretary Hull's conversations with Ambassador Nomura. Nevertheless, President Roosevelt assured Ambassador Nomura that he was looking forward to approximately three days of conversation with Prince Konoye.
The main problem stemmed from the choice of a meeting place. Because the American President, unlike the Japanese Prime Minister who could appoint an acting minister to handle such matters, could not designate the Vice President to sign bills from Congress during his absence,[124] a three weeks round trip to Hawaii would take too much time, whereas a trip to Juneau would consume only 14 days.
Ambassador Nomura declared that as far as Japan was concerned the question of a meeting place was secondary, but it was desired to have the conference take place at the earliest possible date. Though he did not object to this request, President Roosevelt did not suggest a definite time.
President Roosevelt added that the recent meeting with Prime Minister Churchill had been postponed on account of the Balkan War, and that the meeting was then held after Congress had approved it.[125]
31. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 28, 1941)
(a) State Department's Report[126]
Calling at Secretary Hull's apartment after his interview with President Roosevelt earlier in the same day, August 28, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that he was much encouraged regarding the attempts to improve relations between the two countries. Since Japan was desirous only that the conference be held at an early date, preferably between September 21 and September 25, 1941, to offset Japanese press attacks against the United States, President Roosevelt's suggestion that the conference be held at Juneau, Alaska would probably be approved by Prime Minister Konoye. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that Prince Konoye would probably be accompanied by a staff of twenty representatives from the Foreign Office, the Army, the Navy, and the Japanese Embassy in Washington. This would be very advantageous in that the Japanese Army and Navy representatives would be equally responsible for any settlement reached. An agreement on publicity concerning the conference would have to be reached by the two governments, especially since the Prime Minister would have to leave Tokyo five days before President Roosevelt left Washington.[127]
[122] III, 89.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid.
[125] III, 90.
[126] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 576-579.
[127] Ibid.
[27]
After promising to refer these points to President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull mentioned the questions that would inevitably arise at such a conference. In his opinion the actual conference should serve only to ratify matters of importance already agreed to in principle. Reference was made to certain difficulties encountered in the previous informal conversations which had caused delays and had finally resulted in Japan's acting at variance with the spirit of the conversations. In addition, it would be unwise to have a split in the Japanese Diet over the question of peace.
Recognizing the merits of Secretary Hull's remarks, Ambassador Nomura then summed up the three major difficulties encountered in their conversations: Japan's relations with the Axis; the retention of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia; and the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. Only in regard to the stationing of Japanese forces in North China did the Japanese Ambassador anticipate any trouble. Concerning Japan's relations with the Axis, Ambassador Nomura was confident that as long as America's attitude of self-protection remained reasonable and it did not demand a nullification of the Tripartite Pact by requesting a blanket guarantee from Japan for any action it took against Germany in the name of self-defense, no breach would occur between the two countries.
Secretary Hull commented that Mr. Matsuoka's constant stressing of Japan's alignment with the Axis and the inopportune time chosen for the signing of the Tripartite Pact had already produced an unfavorable effect on America. Unless something were done to counteract the unfavorable impression, it would prove a source of embarrassment to President Roosevelt upon his return from the proposed meeting with Prince Konoye, for as an indication of its current relations with Germany, the United States was already maintaining patrols all the way to Iceland.[128]
At this point, Ambassador Nomura discussed the United States' position in aiding in the settlement of the Chinese situation and commented that Japan preferred to have the United States use its influence to bring Japan and China together to settle their own difficulties rather than have the United States discuss the basic peace terms with Japan. Secretary Hull made it clear, however, that before exercising its good offices between China and Japan, the United States would first consider the basic terms on which Japan proposed to negotiate, since it was necessary to have the friendship and confidence of the Chinese government before and after the negotiations. Both America and Japan, he felt, should consider the potentialities of China as a trading nation.
Ambassador Nomura agreed that the Chinese question was important, but remarked that there were other questions which could be settled at the conference in order to tide over a critical situation. Since the China Incident was one of the major questions calling for settlement, Secretary Hull believed that unless a conciliation were reached in this regard, it would remain the root of future instability. Ambassador Nomura recognized the soundness of this statement, particularly in view of the French Indo-China situation. Mr. Ballantine pointed out that Japan had promised to remove its troops from that area as soon as the China affair was settled.
After recapitulating briefly Secretary Hull's statements to make sure that he understood them, Ambassador Nomura left after commenting that he did not know how far the Japanese government could go in view of internal political difficulties, but Prince Konoye as a man of great courage was willing to assume great risks to improve relations.[129]
[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid.
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
norm 8.nor.007 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Before color MRIs become the norm, the researchers need to test the particles in animals, Ho says. As a proof-of-concept, the team used nickel, which is toxic if ingested, to create the micromagnets, although Zabow says less dangerous materials could easily be used. Still, Ho says, it's uncertain how safe they could make the technology.
“The key question is, when they apply it to biological systems and live animals, what will they get?” Ho says. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
“The key question is, when they apply it to biological systems and live animals, what will they get?” Ho says. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Saturday, May 23, 2009
walk 6.wal.001001 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
For a nerve cell, it’s all about making connections and dropping the duds. Harvard neuroscientist Jeff Lichtman has been keeping an eye on nerve networking by observing how one neuron reacts Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire when another grows silent. In a phone interview, he described the situation by analogy: “It’s like if I’m talking to you and you stop talking back to me. After a while I’ll hang up and walk away.”
Nerve cells grown in petri dishes are known to act this way — abandoning cells that ignore the chemical messages they send.
But now Lichtman and his colleagues, reporting online June 22 in Nature Neuroscience, document the phenomenon in a living animal, using a technique that allowed them to watch cells grow and change in real time.
The team shows how nerve cells from the brain stem (stained yellow in image) of a living mouse make connections with nerve cells (stained blue) near the salivary gland.
Nerve cells grown in petri dishes are known to act this way — abandoning cells that ignore the chemical messages they send.
But now Lichtman and his colleagues, reporting online June 22 in Nature Neuroscience, document the phenomenon in a living animal, using a technique that allowed them to watch cells grow and change in real time.
The team shows how nerve cells from the brain stem (stained yellow in image) of a living mouse make connections with nerve cells (stained blue) near the salivary gland.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
golden 6.gol.002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
This month — 8/8/08, to be precise — the curtain rose on what many experts believe could prove to be the first genetically modified Olympics.
For the unscrupulous or overdriven Olympic athlete, the banned practice of “doping” by taking hormones or other drugs to enhance athletic prowess may seem so last century. The next thing in doping is more profound and more dangerous. It’s called gene doping: permanently inserting strength- or endurance-boosting genes into DNA.
“Once you put that gene in, it’s there for the rest of that person’s life,” says Larry Bowers, a clinical chemist at the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency in Colorado Springs, Colo. “You can’t go back and fish it out.”
Scientists developed the technology behind gene doping as a promising way to treat genetic diseases such as sickle-cell anemia and the “bubble boy” immune deficiency syndrome. This experimental medical technology — called gene therapy — has begun to emerge from the pall of early failures and fatalities in clinical trials. As gene therapy begins to enjoy some preliminary successes, scientists at the World Anti-Doping Agency, which oversees drug testing for the Olympics, have started to worry that dopers might now see abuse of gene therapy in sport as a viable option, though the practice was banned by WADA in 2003.
“Gene therapy has now broken out from what seemed to be too little progress and has now shown real therapies for a couple diseases, and more coming,” says Theodore Friedmann, a gene therapy expert at the University of California, San Diego and chairman of WADA’s panel on gene doping.
While gene therapy research has begun making great strides, the science of detecting illicit use of gene therapy in sport is only now finding its legs. To confront the perceived inevitability of gene doping, Friedmann and other scientists have started in recent years to explore the problem of detecting whether an athlete has inserted a foreign gene — an extra copy that may be indistinguishable from the natural genes — into his or her DNA.
It’s proving to be a formidable challenge. Genetic makeup varies from person to person, and world-class athletes are bound to have some natural genetic endowments that other people lack. Somehow, gene-doping tests must distinguish between natural genetic variation among individuals and genes inserted artificially — and the distinction must stand up in court.
Scientists are fighting genetics with genetics, so to speak, enlisting the latest technologies for gene sequencing or for profiling the activity of proteins to find the telltale signs of gene doping. Some techniques attempt the daunting search for the foreign gene itself, like looking for a strand of hay in an enormous haystack.
But new research could also lead to an easier and more foolproof approach: detecting the characteristic ways that an inserted gene affects an athlete’s body as a whole.
Resurgence of gene therapy
In 1999, 18-year-old Jesse Gelsinger died during a gene therapy trial for a rare liver disease. Investigators later attributed his death to a violent immune reaction to the delivery virus rather than to the therapeutic gene. His death was a major setback for the field. It also may have scared away early would-be gene dopers.
In recent years, safety and efficacy of gene therapy have shown signs of progress in numerous clinical trials for conditions ranging from early-onset vision loss to erectile dysfunction. As scientists develop ways to use safer, weaker viruses for delivery, and as gene therapies wind their way through clinical trials, athletes and coaches might start to see gene doping as even more viable than they already do.
In the courtroom during the 2006 trial of Thomas Springstein, a German track coach accused of giving performance-enhancing drugs to high-school–age female runners, prosecutors read aloud an e-mail Springstein had written that would shock the sports world.
“The new Repoxygen is hard to get,” the e-mail read, according to press reports. “Please give me new instructions soon so that I can order the product before Christmas.”
Repoxygen isn’t merely another doping drug such as a hormone or the latest designer steroid — it’s an experimental virus designed to deliver a therapeutic gene and insert it into a person’s DNA.
British pharmaceutical company Oxford BioMedica developed Repoxygen in 2002 as a treatment for severe anemia. The therapy “infects” patients with a harmless virus carrying a modified gene that encodes erythropoietin, a protein that boosts red blood cell production. This protein, often called EPO, is itself a favorite among dopers seeking to increase their oxygen capacity, and hence their endurance.
Viruses have the natural ability to inject genetic material into their host’s DNA. The host’s cells can translate that gene into active proteins as if the foreign gene were the cells’ own. So by delivering the gene for EPO within a virus, Repoxygen could potentially increase the amounts of EPO protein — and the change would be permanent.
Athletes might also be tempted by perhaps the most tantalizing gene therapy experiment of all: the “mighty mouse.” In 1998, H. Lee Sweeney and his colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine injected mice with a virus carrying a gene that boosted production of insulin-like growth factor 1, or IGF-1, a protein that regulates muscle growth. As a result, the mice had 15 percent more muscle mass and were 14 percent stronger than untreated mice — without ever having exercised. The treatment also prevented the decline of muscle mass as the mice grew older.
Other genetic paths to increase muscle strength and volume could include the gene for human growth hormone or segments of DNA that block a protein called myostatin, which normally limits muscle growth.
Endurance might also be boosted by the gene encoding a protein called peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor delta, or PPAR-delta. Mice engineered to have extra copies of this gene hopped onto a treadmill and, without ever having trained, ran about twice as far as unaltered mice. The extra PPAR-delta improved the ability of the mice’s muscles to use fat molecules for energy, and it shifted the animals’ ratio of muscle fiber types from fast-twitch toward slow-twitch fibers — a change that would improve muscle endurance in people as well. Ronald Evans and his colleagues at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies in La Jolla, Calif., published the research in 2004.
Since then, Evans says, he has been routinely approached by curious coaches and athletes. “I’ve had athletes come to my lectures and go to the microphone and say, ‘If I took this drug, would it work with EPO and growth hormone?’ I mean, they would ask this publicly,” Evans says.
“Based on athletes I’ve talked with, I’d say that it’s a reasonable possibility that gene doping will be used in this Olympics, and I think there’s a very high probability that it will be used in the next Olympics,” he says.
Elusive signs
Around the time that Evans was announcing his “marathon mouse” results, WADA kicked off a funding program to focus scientific research on strategies for detecting gene doping.
“A key part of our project is to try to define what we call signatures of doping,” says Olivier Rabin, a biomedical engineer and director of science for WADA. “We are looking at the impact of those kinds of genetic manipulations at different levels.”
The first and most obvious approach is simply to look for the inserted gene among the roughly 6 billion “letters” of genetic code in both sets of a person’s chromosomes.
For clinical gene therapy trials, finding the inserted gene is fairly easy. Scientists know the exact sequence of the gene they inserted, and often they know where on the person’s chromosomes the gene should have ended up. Standard DNA sequencing techniques can reveal the genetic code for that region on the chromosomes, and the unique sequence of the inserted gene will be in plain view. With gene doping, the situation is much trickier.
“In sport, you don’t know where that gene will be put, what virus was used or even what particular variety of gene was used,” Friedmann says. “You don’t have the advantage of knowing where to look and for what, so the argument is to look everywhere.”
Another difficulty is that copies of the foreign gene wouldn’t be in all of a person’s cells. The gene-carrying viruses selectively target certain tissues such as muscle or liver (the liver helps to regulate muscle metabolism). Some blood cells might also take in the viruses’ genetic payloads, but it’s questionable whether a standard blood sample from an athlete would contain the gene. Instead, anti-doping officials would have to sample muscle tissue directly using punch biopsies, a procedure that is mildly painful.
“No one’s expecting that an athlete will agree to a muscle biopsy,” Friedmann says. “That’s a nonstarter.”
Still, direct detection of inserted genes could work in some cases. Evans points out that an artificially inserted gene for PPAR-delta would be much smaller than the natural gene. That’s because the natural gene is far too big to hitch a ride on the carrier virus. Fitting the gene onto a virus means only a trimmed down version of the gene can be used. This distinctive genetic pattern would only exist in a person who had undergone gene doping.
In other cases, genes would end up in tissues where they’re not normally active, making detection more straightforward. For example, the liver and kidneys normally produce the protein EPO, which makes red blood cells, but gene doping could deliver the EPO-coding gene directly to muscle tissues. The trick, then, is to find a noninvasive way to detect where EPO production is occurring inside the body.
One solution is to use medical imaging techniques such as PET scans. In research funded by WADA, Jordi Segura and his colleagues at the Municipal Institute for Medical Research in Barcelona, Spain, attached slightly radioactive “flags” to molecules made during EPO production. A standard PET scan can spot this radioactivity, revealing where EPO was being made in the bodies of mice injected with gene-doping viruses, the team reported in the October 2007 Therapeutic Drug Monitoring. The researchers showed that production of EPO in muscle tissue was a telltale sign of gene doping.
With radioactivity that is relatively mild, the labels are routinely used in medical imaging to diagnose diseases and don’t pose a significant hazard. But Friedmann notes that asking athletes to undergo such a procedure could be controversial.
Detection by proxy
Another approach is to look for signs of the viral “infection,” rather than for the gene itself. Even a weakened virus could trigger a mild, and specific, immune reaction that might show up in a blood test.
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing this method is that viruses aren’t the only way to deliver a gene into a doper’s body. “The reality is that you can just inject naked DNA directly into tissues” with a syringe, Evans says. “Direct injection could be more local and harder to detect.”
This relatively crude way to insert a gene won’t spread the gene as widely through a person’s body as viruses injected into the bloodstream would. But many cells near the site of injection could take in the gene, perhaps enough to improve athletic performance.
Microscopic, synthetic spheres of fat molecules called liposomes can also shuttle doping genes into the body.
To prevent dopers from evading detection by simply changing delivery vehicles, scientists are also exploring a third approach to developing tests: proteomics, the detailed study of all the proteins in the human body.
Regardless of the vehicle used, adding a new gene to the body’s tightly woven web of interacting genes and proteins will cause ripples of change to spread throughout that web. “There will be a body-wide response no matter what gene you use or where in the body you put it,” Friedmann says, “and those changes can be used as a signature of doping.”
Painful biopsies wouldn’t be required. Because the cascade of changes in protein activity would be widespread, anti-doping officials could test using blood, urine, hair or even sweat. Tools developed for the burgeoning fields of genomics and proteomics allow scientists to see the activity levels of thousands of genes or proteins simultaneously.
In preliminary unpublished experiments, Friedmann and his colleagues injected a type of muscle cell with the gene for IGF-1. Activity of hundreds of genes changed as a result, including a boost in the activity of genes that control production of cholesterol, steroids and fatty acids. All of these changes might be detectable with simple blood tests.
WADA is funding half a dozen or so ongoing studies on this proteome-based detection strategy, but research in this area is still at an early stage. “There’s good reason to think that’s likely to work, and a number of labs are having some nice results,” Friedmann says.
As for whether any tests for gene doping will be ready in time for the Beijing Olympics, anti-doping authorities aren’t giving away many hints that might help dopers evade detection. “We never say when our tests are going to be in place,” WADA’s Rabin says.
Even if detection methods do lag behind the games, dopers may want to think twice before assuming they’re in the clear, Friedmann notes. “With stored [blood and urine] samples, one always has the option of going back some months or years later and checking again with the newest tests.” Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Just in case the dangers of tampering with a person’s genetic makeup weren’t enough of a disincentive.
For the unscrupulous or overdriven Olympic athlete, the banned practice of “doping” by taking hormones or other drugs to enhance athletic prowess may seem so last century. The next thing in doping is more profound and more dangerous. It’s called gene doping: permanently inserting strength- or endurance-boosting genes into DNA.
“Once you put that gene in, it’s there for the rest of that person’s life,” says Larry Bowers, a clinical chemist at the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency in Colorado Springs, Colo. “You can’t go back and fish it out.”
Scientists developed the technology behind gene doping as a promising way to treat genetic diseases such as sickle-cell anemia and the “bubble boy” immune deficiency syndrome. This experimental medical technology — called gene therapy — has begun to emerge from the pall of early failures and fatalities in clinical trials. As gene therapy begins to enjoy some preliminary successes, scientists at the World Anti-Doping Agency, which oversees drug testing for the Olympics, have started to worry that dopers might now see abuse of gene therapy in sport as a viable option, though the practice was banned by WADA in 2003.
“Gene therapy has now broken out from what seemed to be too little progress and has now shown real therapies for a couple diseases, and more coming,” says Theodore Friedmann, a gene therapy expert at the University of California, San Diego and chairman of WADA’s panel on gene doping.
While gene therapy research has begun making great strides, the science of detecting illicit use of gene therapy in sport is only now finding its legs. To confront the perceived inevitability of gene doping, Friedmann and other scientists have started in recent years to explore the problem of detecting whether an athlete has inserted a foreign gene — an extra copy that may be indistinguishable from the natural genes — into his or her DNA.
It’s proving to be a formidable challenge. Genetic makeup varies from person to person, and world-class athletes are bound to have some natural genetic endowments that other people lack. Somehow, gene-doping tests must distinguish between natural genetic variation among individuals and genes inserted artificially — and the distinction must stand up in court.
Scientists are fighting genetics with genetics, so to speak, enlisting the latest technologies for gene sequencing or for profiling the activity of proteins to find the telltale signs of gene doping. Some techniques attempt the daunting search for the foreign gene itself, like looking for a strand of hay in an enormous haystack.
But new research could also lead to an easier and more foolproof approach: detecting the characteristic ways that an inserted gene affects an athlete’s body as a whole.
Resurgence of gene therapy
In 1999, 18-year-old Jesse Gelsinger died during a gene therapy trial for a rare liver disease. Investigators later attributed his death to a violent immune reaction to the delivery virus rather than to the therapeutic gene. His death was a major setback for the field. It also may have scared away early would-be gene dopers.
In recent years, safety and efficacy of gene therapy have shown signs of progress in numerous clinical trials for conditions ranging from early-onset vision loss to erectile dysfunction. As scientists develop ways to use safer, weaker viruses for delivery, and as gene therapies wind their way through clinical trials, athletes and coaches might start to see gene doping as even more viable than they already do.
In the courtroom during the 2006 trial of Thomas Springstein, a German track coach accused of giving performance-enhancing drugs to high-school–age female runners, prosecutors read aloud an e-mail Springstein had written that would shock the sports world.
“The new Repoxygen is hard to get,” the e-mail read, according to press reports. “Please give me new instructions soon so that I can order the product before Christmas.”
Repoxygen isn’t merely another doping drug such as a hormone or the latest designer steroid — it’s an experimental virus designed to deliver a therapeutic gene and insert it into a person’s DNA.
British pharmaceutical company Oxford BioMedica developed Repoxygen in 2002 as a treatment for severe anemia. The therapy “infects” patients with a harmless virus carrying a modified gene that encodes erythropoietin, a protein that boosts red blood cell production. This protein, often called EPO, is itself a favorite among dopers seeking to increase their oxygen capacity, and hence their endurance.
Viruses have the natural ability to inject genetic material into their host’s DNA. The host’s cells can translate that gene into active proteins as if the foreign gene were the cells’ own. So by delivering the gene for EPO within a virus, Repoxygen could potentially increase the amounts of EPO protein — and the change would be permanent.
Athletes might also be tempted by perhaps the most tantalizing gene therapy experiment of all: the “mighty mouse.” In 1998, H. Lee Sweeney and his colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine injected mice with a virus carrying a gene that boosted production of insulin-like growth factor 1, or IGF-1, a protein that regulates muscle growth. As a result, the mice had 15 percent more muscle mass and were 14 percent stronger than untreated mice — without ever having exercised. The treatment also prevented the decline of muscle mass as the mice grew older.
Other genetic paths to increase muscle strength and volume could include the gene for human growth hormone or segments of DNA that block a protein called myostatin, which normally limits muscle growth.
Endurance might also be boosted by the gene encoding a protein called peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor delta, or PPAR-delta. Mice engineered to have extra copies of this gene hopped onto a treadmill and, without ever having trained, ran about twice as far as unaltered mice. The extra PPAR-delta improved the ability of the mice’s muscles to use fat molecules for energy, and it shifted the animals’ ratio of muscle fiber types from fast-twitch toward slow-twitch fibers — a change that would improve muscle endurance in people as well. Ronald Evans and his colleagues at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies in La Jolla, Calif., published the research in 2004.
Since then, Evans says, he has been routinely approached by curious coaches and athletes. “I’ve had athletes come to my lectures and go to the microphone and say, ‘If I took this drug, would it work with EPO and growth hormone?’ I mean, they would ask this publicly,” Evans says.
“Based on athletes I’ve talked with, I’d say that it’s a reasonable possibility that gene doping will be used in this Olympics, and I think there’s a very high probability that it will be used in the next Olympics,” he says.
Elusive signs
Around the time that Evans was announcing his “marathon mouse” results, WADA kicked off a funding program to focus scientific research on strategies for detecting gene doping.
“A key part of our project is to try to define what we call signatures of doping,” says Olivier Rabin, a biomedical engineer and director of science for WADA. “We are looking at the impact of those kinds of genetic manipulations at different levels.”
The first and most obvious approach is simply to look for the inserted gene among the roughly 6 billion “letters” of genetic code in both sets of a person’s chromosomes.
For clinical gene therapy trials, finding the inserted gene is fairly easy. Scientists know the exact sequence of the gene they inserted, and often they know where on the person’s chromosomes the gene should have ended up. Standard DNA sequencing techniques can reveal the genetic code for that region on the chromosomes, and the unique sequence of the inserted gene will be in plain view. With gene doping, the situation is much trickier.
“In sport, you don’t know where that gene will be put, what virus was used or even what particular variety of gene was used,” Friedmann says. “You don’t have the advantage of knowing where to look and for what, so the argument is to look everywhere.”
Another difficulty is that copies of the foreign gene wouldn’t be in all of a person’s cells. The gene-carrying viruses selectively target certain tissues such as muscle or liver (the liver helps to regulate muscle metabolism). Some blood cells might also take in the viruses’ genetic payloads, but it’s questionable whether a standard blood sample from an athlete would contain the gene. Instead, anti-doping officials would have to sample muscle tissue directly using punch biopsies, a procedure that is mildly painful.
“No one’s expecting that an athlete will agree to a muscle biopsy,” Friedmann says. “That’s a nonstarter.”
Still, direct detection of inserted genes could work in some cases. Evans points out that an artificially inserted gene for PPAR-delta would be much smaller than the natural gene. That’s because the natural gene is far too big to hitch a ride on the carrier virus. Fitting the gene onto a virus means only a trimmed down version of the gene can be used. This distinctive genetic pattern would only exist in a person who had undergone gene doping.
In other cases, genes would end up in tissues where they’re not normally active, making detection more straightforward. For example, the liver and kidneys normally produce the protein EPO, which makes red blood cells, but gene doping could deliver the EPO-coding gene directly to muscle tissues. The trick, then, is to find a noninvasive way to detect where EPO production is occurring inside the body.
One solution is to use medical imaging techniques such as PET scans. In research funded by WADA, Jordi Segura and his colleagues at the Municipal Institute for Medical Research in Barcelona, Spain, attached slightly radioactive “flags” to molecules made during EPO production. A standard PET scan can spot this radioactivity, revealing where EPO was being made in the bodies of mice injected with gene-doping viruses, the team reported in the October 2007 Therapeutic Drug Monitoring. The researchers showed that production of EPO in muscle tissue was a telltale sign of gene doping.
With radioactivity that is relatively mild, the labels are routinely used in medical imaging to diagnose diseases and don’t pose a significant hazard. But Friedmann notes that asking athletes to undergo such a procedure could be controversial.
Detection by proxy
Another approach is to look for signs of the viral “infection,” rather than for the gene itself. Even a weakened virus could trigger a mild, and specific, immune reaction that might show up in a blood test.
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing this method is that viruses aren’t the only way to deliver a gene into a doper’s body. “The reality is that you can just inject naked DNA directly into tissues” with a syringe, Evans says. “Direct injection could be more local and harder to detect.”
This relatively crude way to insert a gene won’t spread the gene as widely through a person’s body as viruses injected into the bloodstream would. But many cells near the site of injection could take in the gene, perhaps enough to improve athletic performance.
Microscopic, synthetic spheres of fat molecules called liposomes can also shuttle doping genes into the body.
To prevent dopers from evading detection by simply changing delivery vehicles, scientists are also exploring a third approach to developing tests: proteomics, the detailed study of all the proteins in the human body.
Regardless of the vehicle used, adding a new gene to the body’s tightly woven web of interacting genes and proteins will cause ripples of change to spread throughout that web. “There will be a body-wide response no matter what gene you use or where in the body you put it,” Friedmann says, “and those changes can be used as a signature of doping.”
Painful biopsies wouldn’t be required. Because the cascade of changes in protein activity would be widespread, anti-doping officials could test using blood, urine, hair or even sweat. Tools developed for the burgeoning fields of genomics and proteomics allow scientists to see the activity levels of thousands of genes or proteins simultaneously.
In preliminary unpublished experiments, Friedmann and his colleagues injected a type of muscle cell with the gene for IGF-1. Activity of hundreds of genes changed as a result, including a boost in the activity of genes that control production of cholesterol, steroids and fatty acids. All of these changes might be detectable with simple blood tests.
WADA is funding half a dozen or so ongoing studies on this proteome-based detection strategy, but research in this area is still at an early stage. “There’s good reason to think that’s likely to work, and a number of labs are having some nice results,” Friedmann says.
As for whether any tests for gene doping will be ready in time for the Beijing Olympics, anti-doping authorities aren’t giving away many hints that might help dopers evade detection. “We never say when our tests are going to be in place,” WADA’s Rabin says.
Even if detection methods do lag behind the games, dopers may want to think twice before assuming they’re in the clear, Friedmann notes. “With stored [blood and urine] samples, one always has the option of going back some months or years later and checking again with the newest tests.” Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Just in case the dangers of tampering with a person’s genetic makeup weren’t enough of a disincentive.
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